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Abstract
This article refers to a broadly understood issue of freedom usage in culture. 
It discusses the relationship between the Greeks and Macedonians, concerning 
the use of the name Macedonia and the image of Alexander the Great in the 
names, culture and symbols of both countries. The author reviews a problem 
of deriving benefits for one culture from another’s heritage, exemplified by Ro-
mania as the heir of the Roman Empire. Some consideration is offered also with 
regard to legality of such procedures and the reaction of the international opin-
ion. The Author provides specific and undeniable examples of relevant behav-
iours and approximates possible scenarios of relevant situations in the future 
with consequences to which such conflicts may lead.
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This article raises issues of using symbols and myths in the process of 
shaping cultural identity based on the cases of Macedonia and Greece. The 
phenomenon is fairly prevalent, while the countries I have chosen are not 
the only ones that make such efforts. The usage of these two cultural me-
diums, namely symbols and myths, is a reference to a broader concern, 
which is freedom in culture itself. A fundamental question arising in this 
context may be formulated in the following way – are citizens really enjoy-
ing a vast array of rights, liberties in democratic European countries in the 
21st century or rather, are they witnessing progressive censorship, along 
with limitations on freedom of speech and action? A further question that 
develops from that above concerns whether culture is a realm where no 
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restrictions are conducive to creativity and one where there are no limita-
tions imposed on using its products by individuals, groups, communities 
and societies. I propose to answer these questions within the context of 
the European Union as the entity which speaks out on international con-
flicts and disputes. 
The European Union, as an institution with a rich history and multi-
ple perspectives, unites the countries of Europe (Davies, 2010, p. 1125). 
The majority of the countries of the Old Continent are part of it, and in 
spite of their many vested interests, are able to work out compromises. 
The EU constitutes a system which is made up of representative bodies 
and departments, whose overriding goal is multilayered co-operation and 
the avoidance of situations from the 20th century when nearly the entire 
world was engaged in two bloody global wars. In order to find a common 
interest and strengthen its status among the Member States, the EU must 
appeal to events and symbols which provide the guarantee of existence 
and secure its position in history. Symbols are an important element of the 
identification process and form an emotional attachment to institutions 
(Stradowski, 2013, pp. 157–158). The EU anthem, namely Ode to Joy by 
Ludwig van Beethoven, a shared European currency, the EU flag, European 
Day which occurs on the 9th of May, or the motto “united in diversity” may 
be classified as such symbols (Skrzypczak, 2010, p. 212). This motto under-
scores that the EU safeguards cultural diversity while, at the same time, 
defining the axiological foundations of unity. In building its own identity, 
this refers to aspects of European history and culture which constitute fun-
damental values. These are Christianity, antiquity, democracy, respect for 
the rights of minorities, acceptance, communication and peaceful dialogue, 
all of which build close ties among all its members (Paleczny, 2008, p. 57).
Many times these premises are put to the test. Among instances of 
co-operation, numerous conflicts occur in Europe on many levels, from 
those which are economic down to those which are ethnic. One example is 
the Greek-Macedonian dispute. Although I use the term “Macedonia” re-
garding the eponymous country, this term is not acknowledged by every-
body to be correct (Karadzoski & Adamczyk, 2015, Wilczak, 2018). If I had 
used this name to describe the Greek region, already known from ancient 
times, then I would have won Greeks’ support and recognition. Unfortu-
nately, Macedonians cannot expect that. Greeks do not approve of the 
name in the context of the existence of the country neighbouring them. 
They do not allow its usage either in full or in part. Although the acronym, 
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FYROM (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) has been thus far 
acceptable, this was only given temporary approval (Pietruszewski, 2008, 
Wilczak, 2018). 
I shall cite the history of the shaping of Macedonian statehood regard-
ing its connections with the Greeks as it is a starting point for understand-
ing both parties in the conflict, as well as further reflections.
Ancient Macedonians were the descendants of the Dorian tribe, thus 
the same as their Greek neighbours. They also spoke similar languages. 
They were one of many groups inhabiting the Balkan territories in ancient 
times. They played an important role, along with Thessalians and Epirots, 
since the 4th century BC when they became the Hellenes. Living in the 
mountains at the meeting point of two cultures, they were the subject of 
an identity which was difficult to ascertain. Greeks regarded Macedonians 
as a people which could trace back their origins to a similar cultural circle 
(albeit one understood as having a barbarian language and beliefs), with 
certain differences, such as monarchy being the political system estab-
lished in Macedonia. In view of the fact that they partook in the Olympic 
games, they were considered Hellenes. Macedonia emerged as a hege-
monic force in the region over time and brought other city states under its 
control. Its glory days occurred during the reign of Philip II of Macedon and 
his son, Alexander the Great. They were annexed to the Roman Empire in 
the 2nd century C.E. Subsequently, Slavic settlers began to flock in these 
lands from the 4th century C.E. These territories were inhabited by many 
peoples in latter centuries and each one left their stamp on relations in the 
Balkans. Upon the decline of Byzantium, Serbs, Turks and Greeks wielded 
power in these lands. Each of the conquerors strove to pursue the policy 
of nationalisation towards their subjects, which led to divisions within soci-
ety (Hroch, 2003, pp. 49–50).
Upon the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the partition of Macedonia 
then followed. Territory inhabited by many nations of diverse provenance 
and denominations (Pietruszewski, 2008, Felczak & Wasilewski, 1985, 
pp. 367–368) resulted in the awakening of modern-day Macedonians’ na-
tional awareness. In the face of attempts made at annexations by their 
neighbours, who only promoted historical arguments in favour of legitimis-
ing the occupation of their lands, Macedonian peoples put up resistance 
engendered by the will to establish their own independent country. Up to 
the First and Second World Wars, ethnic Macedonian lands were part of 
adjacent countries. The process of denationalisation and a ban on speaking 
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their own language got under way. Christians were displaced to Bulgaria, 
and Muslims to Turkey (Ślupkov, 2011) after the Balkan wars. During the 
Second World War, Macedonians served in ranks of the communists who, 
in return for help, promised to establish a federal Greek state in which 
Macedonia would obtain full rights. After the end of the war, a subsequent 
civil war broke out, as a result of which they were defeated by Greeks and 
which led to reprisals and the mass displacement of entire families. The 
names of towns, villages, as well as surnames were changed to Greek while 
the Macedonian language was forbidden to be used in public life. Corpo-
ral punishment, imprisonment, and even displacement to desert islands 
were inflicted for the violation of these rules in order to undermine the 
national and cultural identity of these emigrants. Efforts were also made 
to uproot the element of Hellenic heritage from Macedonian history and 
acknowledge them as a “Slavic language-speaking minority” (ibid.). Poli-
cies implemented against Macedonians led to the exodus of the nation, 
including emigration to Poland. Returning was made impossible due to ob-
stacles put in the way of those who sought to join their families, as well 
as because of conditions in the country itself, which had split into three 
small homelands. These were: Aegean Macedonia, with its capital in So-
lun (Greek Thessaloniki); Vardar Macedonia, with its capital in Skopje; as 
well as Pirin Macedonia situated in Bulgaria, where a policy of Bulgarisa-
tion was pursued towards these inhabitants in order to break any ties with 
the Greek legacy (Pietruszewski, 2008, Śmieja, 2009). Raised beyond their 
boundaries as Greeks, Macedonians came across an ethnically and cultur-
ally divided land. “Aegeans” were not welcomed by privileged “Vardars” as 
they were able to cross the Greek border without restraint. Moreover, hav-
ing deprived “Aegeans” of their wealth, they have left them without any 
sense of close links with the country. 
The period of 1967–1974 was the time of rule of the Greek military 
junta, the so-called “Regime of the Colonels”. It was the period of dena-
tionalisation, exile and denunciations by neighbours. Despite the fact that 
socialists subsequently rose to power, the situation was not subject to 
change in principle. Although Macedonians only could return to the coun-
try unobstructed, they were required to signing up an oath of loyalty and 
change their surname to sound Greek. With accession of Greece to the EEC 
(European Economic Community), Macedonians expected their neighbours 
to change their approach (Strzałkowski, 2018). In spite of many mediation 
efforts, the situation did not improve.
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Greeks feared that Macedonians were eager to usurp their achieve-
ments and culture, leading to review of their administrative frontiers. 
Since they were treated as a fifth column, they aspired to obtain the same 
rights as Greeks and be acknowledged as rightful citizens. They currently 
comprise 2% of the population in the Greek province of Macedonia. Even 
though they have been recognised as a national minority, they are still not 
entitled to form associations, which is considered a violation of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (Patek, Rydel, Węc, 2003b, pp. 123–
124). Although they are treated as a national group in Bulgaria, in the polit-
ical sense, this does not concern ethnicity as they are perceived to be part 
of the Bulgarian nation. They are treated as fellow countrymen in Serbia 
since the existence of Macedonians as a separate nation is not recognised 
there (Pietruszewski, 2008).
How did this come to be a conflict over names and symbols? The 
Soviet-led Comintern acknowledged the existence of Macedonia in 1934, 
the inhabitants of which were Greeks, Bulgarians and citizens living within 
the limits of what was then Yugoslavia. Subsequently, Josip Broz Tito gave 
a new name to this region in 1944, namely the Socialist Republic of Mace-
donia and codified the language using dialects spoken in this land. An inde-
pendent Republic of Macedonia emerged upon the collapse of Yugoslavia 
at the beginning of the 1990s. For Greeks, this was a temporary arrange-
ment which had grown on transitory Balkan soil and expecting that when 
the post-communist order was to be brought into effect, the name would 
change too (Bodalska, 2018). However, it did not happen so. Macedonians, 
who did not have their own flag but instead used as their symbol the Star 
of Vergina, the burial site of Phillip II of Macedon, began to take steps on 
the international scene as an independent country while at the same time 
exposing themselves to the risk of being invaded by a powerful neighbour.
As the Greeks are anxious that Macedonians are willing to lay claim to 
their heritage and land, they remain unconvinced regarding conceding the 
name “Macedonia” to FYROM. Relations are tense to such an extent that 
the UN has intervened and negotiated the change of flag and constitution 
to reassure the Greek side since the Republic of Macedonia recognised the 
star/sun of Vergina as their emblem in 1992, an emblem officially reserved 
for Greeks (Biernacka-Rygiel, 2015). Both parties, however, identify with 
this symbol. It is an element of cultural identity for contemporary Mac-
edonians, a link with the former Macedonia whose empire, history, cul-
ture goes far beyond the framework of the present country. Subsequently, 
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in 1993, Greeks used it as the official emblem of the region of Macedo-
nia within the borders of their country, which was to identify it as a ref-
erence to its antique and ancient traditions. Not being satisfied with the 
situation, Greece imposed an embargo. Upon UN intervention, the Greeks 
lifted sanctions imposed earlier on their neighbours, although they had an 
effect in that the Macedonian side renounced of all territorial pretensions 
and changed its flag to an eight-rayed sun. In addition, the Turks joined 
in, which owing to their own conflict with Greece, supported the Macedo-
nians in their struggle for acquisition of the right to their own identity and 
national symbols. As their maritime borders are under dispute up to today, 
Turkey was able to exert pressure on the Greeks by supporting a weaker 
neighbouring state.
Let us, therefore take a closer look at the famed warrior who, as with 
the name of the Macedonian state, is an object of controversy. Alexander 
the Great is a symbol of both sides, an ancient figure who reinforces and 
supports the historical and cultural identity of either nation (Davies, 2010, 
pp. 135–136). To Greeks, he is regarded as a symbol of great glory and 
victories, while at the same time reminding Europe of who first laid the 
foundations of philosophy, science and democracy. According to Macedo-
nians, however, Alexander is the figure who has given them the right to 
their own identity, their own state, and is considered the most famous and 
well-known of all Macedonians. Indeed, the ancient ruler is ubiquitous in 
Macedonia. Apart from monuments erected in his honour, his name is 
given to streets, airports or motorways, while the personal names of Al-
exander and Philip are among the most popular. It is incomprehensible to 
Greeks, however, that a nation which nowadays has more in common with 
the sphere of Slavic culture, identifies with Greece and considers itself the 
heir of Alexander the Great. It is worth noting that the Macedonians of 
today are more Slavic than Greek. The region of Macedonia, however, is an 
internal part of Greece and Greeks consider themselves solely entitled to 
refer to the legacy of the illustrious conqueror of Persia. In the present-day 
rhetoric, Alexander is being juggled around as a symbol. Thus, the airport 
in Skopje bears his name, whereas the Greeks have named the airport in 
Thessaloniki in honour of Macedonia, which is to aimed at signifying the 
strong devotion of their nation to the region. On the other hand, Mac-
edonians have raised monuments, such as one worth a few million euro 
in Skopje, which represents “a warrior on horseback”. It is not difficult to 
guess who the warrior is. This led to an inflammation of relations between 
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Skopje and Athens and further obstruction of the accession of Macedonia 
to the European Union and NATO (Wilczak, 2018).
Moreover, in Athens it is easy to notice many motifs related to Alex-
ander the Great, such as those on T-shirts, mugs, or little busts at souvenir 
shops. Associated with Greece and antiquity, he presents a unique attrac-
tion to tourists. If one pays a visit to the military museum, one will find 
their way to a separate room dedicated exclusively to the warrior. Mock-
ups of parts of his military campaigns are exhibited there together with 
display of the 1956 movie Alexander the Great, starring Richard Burton. 
On display are replicas of armour and weaponry, maps presenting his jour-
neys, and the entire legacy Alexander left upon his premature death. Inter-
estingly, one may notice across inscriptions everywhere citing: “Alexander 
the Great” – not Alexander of Macedonia. Thus, Greeks’ attitude towards 
the warrior itself is unambiguous and requires no additional commentary.
The Macedonians, however, are ready to meet half way. Although they 
are willing to change provocative names given to streets, motorways and 
the airport, as well as add qualifying adjectives such as North, Vardar, Up-
per to their country’s name, this is still unacceptable to Greeks. It is neces-
sary to mention steps undertaken by the government of Macedonia, and 
more precisely nationalist parties, who use populist slogans that meet with 
favourable reception and thus add fuel to the flames.
What kind of policy should the European Union adopt towards the 
Greek-Macedonian conflict? While there are a few solutions, it is certainly 
impossible to opt for one that will satisfy both parties as one party will 
always be forced to make concessions. Although Macedonia will probably 
be this party due to an increased inclination to compromise, the Greeks 
must limit their range of demands to those which are more feasible and 
which will not negate the existence of Macedonians, who having shaped 
their own cultural identity, constitute an independent nation with a tur-
bulent history in a borderland country.2 The question may be posed as to 
what constitutes cultural identity. This is defined as a variety of collective 
identity and a certain persistent identification of a group of people with 
a cultural setting. These include the customs, outlooks and ideas which 
solidify the unity of a group. This identity distinguishes us from others 
2 Borderland country is characterised by blending influences of diverse countries 
and cultures, and also relatively few years of existence.
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which creates a certain newness out of a group, a sense of exceptionality 
(Waszczyńska, 2014). 
The European Union is grappling with many domestic issues today. 
Established after the end of the Second World War as an economic com-
munity of unclear political-institutional frameworks, it was essential in the 
process of uniting Europe. At present, it enjoys a high level of confidence, 
albeit not on all grounds, especially as regards issues of migration and ter-
rorism (47% of mistrust among Europeans) (Komisja Europejska, 2018). 
Brussels is remote from many centres of Central and Southern Europe, 
who perceive it as a mediator dictating certain solutions not necessarily 
consistent with the tendencies and sentiments in a given country. This is 
related to a lack of specialised institutions of cultural integration thus far. 
A European Union oriented towards economic strategy and politics does 
not always take historical-cultural factors into consideration when taking 
decisions. In order to rationalise processes, schemes of building a com-
mon identity ought to be implemented as Europe is both multinational 
and multicultural (Skrzypczak, 2010, p. 204). To help with its construction, 
researchers have put forward two positions, namely essentialist and con-
structivist. The first of these is peculiar to traditional societies and pertains 
to a belief in a common ancestry, a quest for history and myths helpful in 
building cultural identity. The second of these is characterised by a con-
stant process and a lack of stability (Skrzypczak, 2010, p. 206).
The already mentioned cultural identity is an ambiguously described 
concept (Skrzypczak, 2010, p. 205). The term “culture” alone has been 
awarded many definitions (Bogucka, 1991, p. 1, Świątkiewicz, 2002, p. 16). 
A common feature they hold are individuals and communities, namely “en-
tities”. These are the ones who create culture, which comes into existence 
and develops along with the human being, its moderator. It is of a person-
alised nature, while even in ruminations on material culture, we mean “the 
human factor” both as the author and recipient. These individuals own 
their identity, with the components which distinguish them including the 
following:
– National spirit
– Historical memory
– Anticipation
– Territory
– Awareness (ibid.).
FREEDOM IN CULTURE – SYMBOLS AND MYTHS IN BUILDING CULTURAL IDENTITY 169
All these attributes create a link with one’s culture and build the cul-
tural identity of a given group, nation, etc. Identity makes references to 
the cultural world, elements of symbolic reality, which allow one to distin-
guish categories of own and foreign (Pietruszewski, 2008). Aside from the 
European awareness of many nations, which is buttressed by the EU itself 
and its governments, there is currently a great number of cultural identi-
ties in Europe. Each state, or ethnic group displays their own, which forms 
an interesting mosaic and conglomerate, although, on the other hand, this 
is conducive to conflict.
The European Union is not only a federation of states, but also a “Home-
land of homelands” in a broader context (Skorowski, 2005, pp. 26–27). One 
of principal objectives of the EU should be cultivating the cultural heri-
tage of each member state. This does not concern full unification but co-
operation in various fields, without the need to force one into renounc-
ing one’s own identity. The EU ought to make every effort to support not 
only countries but also ethnic groups in the sense of their own value and 
uniqueness. It is unacceptable for members of the EU, namely the Greeks 
to discriminate against their Macedonian national minority by not granting 
them fundamental and guaranteed rights. The European Union reacted too 
late to events in this part of Europe, which took place not earlier than the 
1990s. As far as the Greek-Macedonian conflict is concerned, it should be 
settled amicably. The case is difficult to such a degree that symbols used by 
two countries are similar. Macedonia, which bears its own identity, will not 
accept assimilation, incorporation and is hoping not to be pushed to the 
margins of Europe either (Suchocka & Królikowska, 2014, p. 82). 
We know from everyday life how important the cultivation of national 
symbols is. The example of Macedonia and Greece is not an unusual case 
in global terms. Within the concept of the self-determination of nations, 
each state is entitled to take advantage of the legacy of the cultural sphere 
from which it originates. In the past, Poles were referred to Sarmatians, 
while Hungarians sought their ancestors among the Sumerians. As regards 
Macedonia, there is no question of discussing the stealing of symbols since 
it is a fairly extraordinary case. The state in question, which has gained its 
independence recently, is striving to write its own history and the figure of 
Alexander the Great is a good example of legitimising and raising the pro-
file of Macedonia as a country of centuries-old traditions. As their rights 
should be respected, whilst not forgetting about Greeks, the target of Eu-
ropean Union is to reach a proper consensus in compliance with effective 
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rights and international standards. As the EU itself was, as an institution, 
also involved in creating and seeking out symbols for its unification with 
the European continent, it should be a good peacemaker in settling this 
dispute in which the aggrieved party is undoubtedly Macedonia, a country 
unable to unite with the rest of Europe.
To my mind, the idea of compromise is possible in the current Euro-
pean situation as no one can either take over or restrict anyone’s cultural 
identity. Such an example may be found in the case of Romanians and Ital-
ians, who share the tradition of the Roman Empire, as well as Russia and 
Bulgaria which relate to the concept of the Third Rome.
The above-mentioned Romania shall be the subject of further deliber-
ations on freedom in culture, regarding the use of symbols (the symbol in 
this case being the Roman Empire). Additionally, the issue of myth is worth 
taking note of since the theories of many Romanian researchers classify it 
exactly as the pursuance of historical policy. 
Romania is a country which stakes out a claim to the inheritance of the 
Roman Empire, entirely due to the fact that the province of Dacia was part 
of this once-great empire. This land was conquered by the emperor Trajan 
and was included in the empire, while its historical borders partially over-
lap with today’s Romanian frontiers (Jaczynowska, 2002, p. 522). The short-
lived period of Roman rule in these territories surely left mark on their 
subjugated peoples. Although the influx of cultural exemplars, religion and 
administration caused the lands to be strictly governed by the empire, the 
question remains whether a period of just over a century and a half could 
have brought about a complete Romanisation of the population.
The regions along the Danube were very attractive as transport on the 
river and its control yielded high profits. Thus, Rome directed its attention 
to the Dacian tribes inhabiting these lands. Although two campaigns con-
ducted by the empire cost a great deal of effort, the brave Dacians under 
the command of Decebalus were conquered successfully. While Roman 
rule did not last long, it left an indelible stamp. As Roman settlers and le-
gionaries were representatives of highbrow culture, they exerted a strong 
influence on their subjected peoples (Rumuńskie mity, 2009). 
After the short-lived rule of Rome, these lands first came under the 
influence of the Goths before being seized by Slavic tribes. In later cen-
turies, the Pechenegs and Byzantines arrived. Slavic incursions resulted in 
supplanting Byzantine influences in these territories (Wendt, 2014, p. 76). 
In a subsequent period, these regions came under rule of Kievan Rus’, 
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Hungary (Hroch, 2003, pp. 11–14), Turkey, and even the Polish Republic 
(Szczur, 2003, pp. 493, 509, 511, 541), that is countries originating from 
completely different cultural spheres (Wendt, 2014, p. 77). Under rule of 
the Ottoman Porte, the Phanariotes, namely Greeks dispatched from Con-
stantinople as lieutenants, wielded power. In the 17th century, Russian and 
Austrian influences were also noticeable. Therefore, the question may be 
posed as to why Romanians have connected a kind of myth of common 
roots with the empire. The answer to this lies in events that occurred in 
the 19th century.
Thus, attempts were made on the combined Principalities of Moldavia 
and Wallachia (1859–1861) (Davies, 2010, p. 886)3 to romanise the country, 
which was the conglomerate of a great many of cultural influences due 
to constant changes regarding the nationality of Romanians (Moldavians 
and Wallachians had begun to be called Romanians in these regions from 
the 19th century on) (Willaume, 2011, p. 242). The authorities contributed 
to revision of alphabet, which was enriched with a great number of Latin 
words, and to the changing of the names of towns. The example is Cluj, to 
which the name of Napoca was added, which was to commemorate a by-
gone Roman factory in these territories. Monuments of a she-wolf feeding 
the twin brothers, Romulus and Remus, were put up in many other towns, 
with legend having it that one of brothers had been the founder of Rome. 
All these measures were aimed to show that Romania is the lineal heir to 
the legacy of the Roman Empire.
When subjecting the Romanian language to observation, a close simi-
larity to Italian and French may be observed, while it also belongs to group 
of the Eastern Romance languages. Cyrillic script was removed as the al-
phabet since 1860 and was replaced with the Latin alphabet. Slavic influ-
ences were meticulously cleansed away and connotations with the Occi-
dent were restored. Nowadays, as only a small percentage of the language 
is of Slavic origin, Romanian is, therefore, easily comprehensible to an Ital-
ian. Ethnic Romanian lands in 1859 that preached adherence to the cul-
tural sphere of Slavs, chose the pro-Western course due to the influence of 
politicians (Malessa-Drohomirecka, 2016). From today’s perspective this is 
a curious phenomenon, since 250 years ago the language was regarded as 
Slavic, called Wallachian, and written in Cyrillic script. Indeed, Romanians 
3 Duchies had already begun to develop in the 14th century.
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were called Wallachians until the 19th century. Moreover, the etymology 
of the word “Wallachian” traces back its origin to Roman times. Popula-
tions of romanised shepherds bore such names, although it literally means 
a coarse human or a vagrant (Willaume, 2011, p. 242).
The aspirations of Romanians, therefore, should be considered with 
a certain reserve. The attribution of the descent of present-day Romani-
ans to Roman settlers needs to be regarded as a myth since history has 
not found an irrefutable source of evidence to acknowledge this as a fact 
(Rumuńskie mity, 2009). Nevertheless, alluding to this legend has allowed 
Romanians to build their own national identity. Thus, a country under the 
influence of the Middle East and the Slavic cultural sphere felt the need to 
create its own unique identity than espouse that of one of these sides. The 
attribution of Roman descent was distinguished by Romanian historians 
since they are more recognisable than barbarian Goths who were present 
in these territories too. In their view, Romania was and still is “a Roman 
island in a sea of Slavs” (ibid.). Moreover, the attribution of their origins to 
the Romans serves the purpose of ennobling the pedigree, consolidating 
the nation and broadening the Romanian spectrum of historical events. In 
spite of efforts to debunk the myth of Roman descent during the commu-
nist period and underscore the country’s Dacian roots by nationalists, Ro-
mania is consistently striving to allude to a tradition of being the progeny 
and heirs of Rome. Pro-Western parties aim at linking the country with the 
Western cultural sphere (Malessa-Drohomirecka, 2016). This is difficult due 
to the ethnic mix of inhabitants of Romania, which is conducive to vola-
tile sentiments in society and decentralisation. Integration with the EU is, 
therefore, not at the highest level. In addition, there are many stereotypes 
prevalent in Romania, while a significant proportion of country’s popula-
tion is rural, and eurosceptic in general. 
Although the origin of Romanians from Roman settlers is considered 
to be a legend, it is commonly said that in every legend there lies a grain 
of truth. There is no denying the fact that these lands were influenced by 
the Romans. Historical monuments from the time of the empire times bear 
testimony to it. Romanians – that is citizens of Rome who have low self-
esteem, have used their connections with the empire to provide the basis 
for their nationality. It is important to remember that their lands have re-
mained a peculiar cultural mosaic until today. It was also influenced by the 
policy of superpowers who treated Romania as their dominion and sphere 
of influence. As a rule, apart from a few exceptions in history, Romanian 
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statehood was not uniform, and lands consolidated today were under in-
fluence of countries from various cultural spheres (Bulgarians, Turks, Rus-
sians, Hungarians). With such diversity to be taken into account, finding 
a common denominator was the one and only possibility to unite and 
show that despite the differences that divided them, there were common 
roots – namely Roman roots (Całus, 2015, pp. 9–15). During the short-lived 
reign of the empire in these regions, the full Romanisation of the Walla-
chian population was impossible. Moreover, the influences of civilisation 
would not have stood a chance of survival up to now if it had not been 
for the effort put by Romania into “dusting them off” and imposing them 
upon its citizens. Despite the efforts of nationalists to focus attention on 
the Dacians,4 Romanian society gladly adapted to its Roman roots, surely 
through their historical merits and an established empire. It is no accident 
that among the most popular personal names in Romania today one may 
find: Ovid, Adrian (originated from Hadrian), Romulus, Diana, Sabina, Clau-
dia, Livia or Constantine. By deriving from a widely understood freedom in 
culture, and backed up by certain historical facts, which are exaggerated, 
Romanians may claim to be the heirs of the Caesars today, a claim which 
native-born Italians take with a pinch of salt. Nevertheless, an anecdote 
is to be heard among linguists, namely: “If you wish to find out whether 
a particular word was used in ancient Rome, go to Romania and make sure 
of it.” 
Freedom in culture is a privilege that offers many possibilities. Some 
people recall it due to a myth of common descent and their place in his-
tory, which builds historical memory, while others perceive it as quite the 
opposite, namely that it provides reasons for contention and animosity. 
Although the examples set forth here are similar, the Greek-Macedonian 
dispute seems to have more serious consequences as it is based on EU 
interference.5 Nevertheless, freedom constitutes a relevant element of 
present-day public discourse, namely the question of how much freedom 
4 The cultivation of commemorating Romania’s Dacian roots is visible apart from its 
identification with Rome. Thus, Dacia is a popular make of car in Romania.
5 Despite Macedonia having had the status of candidate for joining EU since 2005, 
its accession to membership has been effectively blocked by Greece. Even though the EU 
Commission concedes that the Greeks are infringing the law, no significant steps were 
taken. Macedonians feel as if they have been left stranded with no support from the EU, 
which they accuse of taking a protective approach towards Greece. 
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may there be in a culture and when it may be limited, or whether it should 
be limited at all. In my opinion, on the condition that it does not belie the 
facts or leads to abuses and misrepresentations, this should be respected.
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